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The ethics of human experimentation is a relatively new phenomenon in medicine. The
Nuremberg Code and the Helsinki Declaration focused on informed consent in human experi-
mentation. More recently, ethicists have begun to emphasize that, beyond the needfor con-
sent, the "content" of the experiment also needs to be ethical. The method and process of the
experiment must be humanizing and affirming of the subject as moral agent. The religious
perspective has provided a comprehensive moral foundation, demanding respect for the sub-
jects' moral agency and their right to he treated as equally worthy members of the human
community, thus ensuring the integrity of the subject as person.
The moral and medical controversies over
the use of human subjects in medical research
are a relatively new phenomenon in the long
history of medicine. Prior to the advent of
World War II, medical research tended to be
small-scale and driven primarily by particu-
lar therapeutic motives. During this "pre-
modem" period, little attention was given to
either research itself or the ethical issues
around it. A number of dramatic changes oc-
curred around the time of World War II, which,
to a large degree, initiated the modern debate
around research in general, and the use of
human subjects in particular. During and im-
mediately after the war, medical research be-
came a large-scale, highly organized, and
well-funded effort harnessed to military ob-
jectives and the national interest. The prob-
lems with using human subjects in medical
research were spectacularly displayed in the
gruesome atrocities perpetrated at the hands
of the Nazis and, to a lesser degree, in the early
history of human experimentation here in the
United States. The ethics of human experi-
mentation has come a long way since the time
of these events. Local and national rules have
been promulgated and institutional review
boards now routinely scrutinize experimental
protocols in most hospitals and research cen-
ters. Nevertheless, many of the basic issues
surrounding human experimentation remain
controversial and have thus far evaded defini-
tive resolution. Beyond the universal disap-
proval of Nazi-style experimentation, there is
still a lack of consensus on many aspects of
using human subjects in biomedical research.
To begin to address the complexity surround-
ing human experimentation, I shall not only
review the history involved, but also the un-
derlying moral nonns and principles that are
used to justify such actions.
Before looking at any particular histori-
cal event, it would be prudent to retlect on
the practice of medicine in general. Human
experimentation has always been a part of
medicine. The practice of medicine, espe-
cially in early times, was unpredictable and
unreliable. When faced with an ailing patient,
physicians chose from among various treat-
ment options, many of which had not been
validated or tested by the "scientific method."
Rather, treatment represented a good-will at-
tempt to aid the patient in spite of surround-
ing uncertainty. Notwithstanding immense
technological advancements, the inherent
ambiguity in therapeutic medicine persists.
Both then and now, no two patients are medi-
cally identical, and every physician needs to
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be alert to the possibility that a particular pa-
tient could react to treatment in unexpected
ways. Faced with this unavoidable uncer-
tainty (and thus the inherent element of "the
experimental") in all of medicine, two aspects
of the therapeutic relationship make it mor-
ally acceptable to proceed with directed treat-
ment plans: the patient has given consent and
the "therapeutic experiment" is administered
with the explicit aim of securing that particu-
lar patient's good. The basis for this thera-
peutic relationship springs from antiquity and
is articulated in the Hippocratic Oath. The
Oath, in addition to binding the physician to
"do no harni," has also been argued to pro-
hibit an experiment if the foregone conclu-
sion, probability, ova priori reason to believe
exists that death or disabling injury of the ex-
perimental subject will occur. Interpreted in
this way, the Hippocratic Oath not only out-
McDermotfs utilitarian defense of the
prerogatives of research may have repre-
sented a broad spectrum of opinion within
organized medicine at the timCy but a mere
five years later, with the shocking revela-
tions of the Tuskegee syphilis experiment,
the trust he had calledfor had been effec-
tively shattered.
lines the therapeutic relationship but also the
terms and bounds of good research practices.
The Oath acknowledges the doubt intrinsic
to medicine, but in instructing the physician
to "do no harm" and to focus unswervingly
on the patient, it provides a moral grounding
to guide care. Thus, the Hippocratic Oath it-
self stands as one of the earlier and more in-
fluential documents in the history of human
experimentation ethics.
Perhaps the single most important contem-
porary document is the Nuremberg Code.'
The Code was formulated in 1947 by Ameri-
can Judges sitting in judgment of Nazi physi-
cians accused of conducting murderous and
torturous human experiments in the concen-
tration camps. At the Nuremberg trial, the
Nazis were accused of using the most vulner-
able—institutionalized children, the mentally
retarded, and prisoners—in human experi-
mentation without their consent, hi their own
defense (as posed by Dr. Robert Servatius, a
defense attorney at Nuremberg) they offered
three cardinal points:
• A state may demand a sacrifice from an
individual on behalf of the community; and
decisions as to what the interests of the com-
munity are, what those interests require, and
how great a sacrifice may be demanded are
all to be made by the state alone.
• There are no pertinent valid distinctions
between conscripting somebody for military
service and requiring somebody to submit to
medical experimentation.
• hi the history of medicine, numerous ex-
periments have been carried out on human
p.; beings without their in-
formed consent, and so
why should the Nazi
physicians be singled
out?
The third point is
the most easily dis-
missed. Although it is
true that numerous ex-
periments had previ-
ously been carried out
by physicians on
il unconsenting human
'* beings (e.g., Walter
Reed's yellow fever experiments in Havana,
Richard Strong's plague and beriberi experi-
ments in the Philippines, etc.), they still re-
main the shame of medicine. Citing past
moral lapses can hardly be grounds for cur-
rent legal or ethical leniency. The first two
points warrant more thorough philosophical
consideration. Both are formulated in tenns
of the consequentialist or utilitarian theory,
according to which what is right is defined to
be whatever serves the greatest good of the
greatest number. The most familiar articula-
tion of this theory is taken from Bentham and
Mill.- in which good is identified with happi-
ness, hi the utilitarian system of morality, it
is morally permissible (even advocated) to
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sacrittce the rights of an individual if the good
of society or "the many" will benefit. By defi-
nition, from the point of view of generalized
utilitarianism, the only thing that counts in
settling any moral question is what would be
for the greatest good of the greatest number.
Here, society is fully justified to compel un-
welcome measures in the name of the social
good. In the case of World War II Gennany,
the defense at Nuremberg argued that the sac-
rifice of "the few" in medical experimenta-
tions would aid the many in advancing the
war effort. This conscription of subjects for
medical experimentation, it was argued, was
no different than the sacrifice being required
of drafted men who similarly risked their lives
on the front lines. Each party was asked to
make sacrifices for the needs of society. In
this way, human experimentation without con-
sent was sanctioned and justified.
On October 25, 1946 the indictment of the
Nazi doctors was filed. The court, and the
world, had rejected the justifications given for
the horrifying experimentations performed
during the Third *Reich. In the wake of the
indictment came the Nuremberg Code. This
Code continues to define the current ethical
discussion around human experimentation.
The Code posits research principles deemed
necessary for the moral and humane use of
human beings in experimental research. The
content of the Code can be understood to have
two major parts. The first part of the Code
concerns itself primarily with a procedural
matter—the procurement of voluntary in-
formed consent as an "absolutely essential"
condition for using humans in experimenta-
tion. A physician should never do anything
to a patient or subject that is inherently coer-
cive, and no procedure may be performed
without obtaining the patient's full consent.
This means that the patient should be
so situated as to be able to exercise free
power of choice... and should have sulTi-
cient knowledge and comprehension of
the elements of the subject matter in-
volved.^
The insistence on informed consent demon-
strates the belief that if the process is just, then
the substance or content of the experimenta-
tion will likewise be morally upright.
The second part of the Code focuses more
explicitly on the substance of human experi-
mentation. It defines a set of specific criteria
by which the content of the experiment can be
judged to be morally justifiable. The second
part of the code includes, among others, such
criteria as the requirement that the experiment
yield fruitful results, not be random in nature,
be designed on the basis of animal studies, and
be conducted to avoid all unnecessary suffer-
ing and injury.^ This second part of the Code,
unlike the first, clearly articulates a proper
"content" to be included when constructing
human experiments. In a very explicit man-
ner it outlines for the potential researcher a
specific standard which must be followed in
order to have a morally licit experiment.
The Code has its grounding in a markedly
different philosophical tradition from the one
used in defense of the doctors at the
Nuremberg trials. The Nuremberg Code's
emphasis on informed consent, as well as on
specific safeguards within the experimental
protocol itself, are both designed to protect
the patient's or subject's right to the inviola-
bility of person. The moral content of this
requirement is perhaps best described by the
Kantian principle of treating other persons as
ends in themselves and never simply as means
to an end they do not share ("the kingdom of
ends" argument).'^ The informed consent re-
quirement can be seen as protecting the moral
status of persons who also happen to be ex-
perimental subjects. In this philosophical
scheme, to use a person without consent for
an experiment is untenable, regardless of the
benefit that society may procure. Each indi-
vidual person has inherent worth that is ines-
timable and that cannot be factored into the
consequentialist equation. Although society
in general may suffer, the preeminent value
of each individual cannot be violated. The
individual's autonomy demands respect; thus,
the decisi(Mi concerning whether or not to par-
ticipate in experimentation belongs only to the
individual. In this way, the Nuremberg Code
insists that medical investigators alone can-
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not set the rules for the ethical conduct of re-
search. By adopting a human-rights perspec-
tive that acknowledges the central ity of the
individual worth of each person, the Code
forever changed the way human experimen-
tation is viewed.
Following Nuremberg, there were addi-
tional attempts at codifying the ethical and
moral criteria of human experimentation. The
most prominent was the World Medical
Association's Declaration of Helsinki in 1964
(subsequently revised in 1975, 1983, 1989,
1996, and 2000)." Although the Declaration
clearly acknowledges the authority of the
Nuremberg Code and grounds itself within it,
the Helsinki Declaration attempts to have peer
review supplement, and even supplant, in-
formed consent as the central principle.
Whereas the Nuremberg Code focused more
on the human rights of research subjects, the
Declaration of Helsinki centers more on the
obligation of physicians/investigators to their
research subjects. Despite these differences,
the major philosophical principles and norms
grounding the declarations are the same. The
utilitarian calculus is spurned in favor of a
more Kantian deontological perspective. Note
the last sentence of the Helsinki Declaration:
In research on man, the interests of sci-
ence and society should never take pre-
cedence over considerations related to the
well-being of the subject.'
In each document, persons are given a spe-
cial moral status that cannot be violated by
the researcher or state. Each individual has
personal goals, aims, and projects that must
be respected. In rigidly codifying the proper
relations between physician-researchers and
subjects, both the Nuremberg Code and the
Helsinki Declaration stress that the good of
individual patients must always take prece-
dence over the good of society. Given the
basic tension between individual and social
rights, not everyone finds solace in these dec-
larations. Some researchers in the 1960s and
1970s rejected the high-sounding declarations
and regulations as impractical and impotent
for resolving the moral dilemmas around hu-
man experimentation.
When challenged by reformers in the late
1960s and early 1970s, many researchers re-
sorted back to utilitarian arguments against
increased ethical and legal regulation of bio-
medical research. A good example of this
utilitarian defense can be found in Walsh
McDermott's famed 1967 "Opening Com-
ments on the Changing Mores of Biomedical
Research."** McDemiott contended that medi-
cal research had bestowed great benefits on
society and in so doing had created a kind of
societal expectation of—even right to—fur-
ther research. To satisfy this societal expec-
tation, according to McDemiott, there may be
times when the good of society must take pre-
cedence over the good of the individual. In-
deed, not unlike the defense team at
Nuremberg, he noted that, outside the sphere
of medicine, society often calls for such sac-
rifices, such as in the military draft. At such
times, researchers unfortunately may have to
single out certain individuals for participation
in research. McDermott, not unlike many of
his peers at the time, concluded that society
must simply trust the research community to
do the right thing, and this community will
on occasion need to call for individual sacri-
fice. McDermott's utilitarian defense of the
prerogatives of research may have represented
a broad spectrum of opinion within organized
medicine at the time, but a mere five years
later, with the shocking revelations of the
Tuskegee syphilis experiment, the trust he had
called for had been effectively shattered.
The history of human experimentation in
the United States has had a number of dra-
matic defining moments. Each in its own way
shaped the ethical debate, as well as the policy
regulating human experimentation. What can
be accomplished here is a brief overview of
two controversial studies which significantly
impacted the ethical landscape: the Tuskegee
syphilis experiment and the Willowbrook
School experiments.
In 1932 the U.S. Public Health Service
initiated an experiment in Macon County,
Alabama, to determine the natural course of
untreated, latent syphilis in black males. The
researchers recruited syphilitic men by tell-
ing the subjects they would be treated for "bad
308 The Journal ofFaith and Science Exchangey 2000
blood." When penicillin became widely avail-
able by the early 195()s as the preferred treat-
ment for syphilis, the men did not receive this
therapy. Moreover, a federal oversight com-
mittee repeatedly decided to continue the
study and even on occasion actually sought
to prevent treatment. Not until 1972 was the
experiment brought to a halt, and in August a
"Final Report" was issued that found the study
to have been "ethically unjustified."'' In criti-
cizing the Tuskegee study, the Final Report
focused on the issues of penicillin therapy and,
more specifically, informed consent. The re-
port makes the distinction between "submit-
ting voluntarily" versus "informed consent."
The Report points out that although the par-
ticipants were "voluntarily" participating with
researchers, this in no way signified that in-
fomied consent was obtained. Infomied con-
sent implies that participation be not only vol-
untary, but also well informed. The investi-
gation panel held that this criterion of in-
fonned consent had not been met, and that
the experiment, thus, was both ethically im-
When the experiment came to public lights the
initial discussion centered once again upon
informed consent. Although the parents had
given consenty there were questions as to
whether this had not been subtly coerced, and
whether parents ethically could even give such
proxy consentfor their children.
permissible and against the spirit of the
Nuremberg and Helsinki Declarations. The
Final Report stated emphatically that
one fundamental ethical rule is that a per-
son should not be subjected to avoidable
risk oF death or physical harm unless he
freely and intelligently consents.'"
By focusing on informed consent, the inves-
tigatory panel wanted to make it clear that a
subject's refusal of treatment must be legally
and ethically honored. Personal autonomy
over important decisions in one's life, and the
right to attempt to realize one's own value-
ordering, are so important as to take prece-
dence over the demands of scientific advance-
ment.
The Final Report's almost exclusive fo-
cus on informed consent is interesting. Un-
doubtedly, informed consent is critical to
the ethical use of human subjects in biomedi-
cal research and experimentation. Informed
consent ensures that subjects are treated as
moral equals with the experimenters, and as
capable of participating in decisions. Despite
this importance of informed consent, the ethi-
cal scrutiny of human experimentation must
not end there. To conclude that a study is ethi-
cal, much more than infomied consent is re-
quired. In a comprehensive ethical analysis,
attention must be paid to both the method (i.e.,
obtaining consent), but also the content (i.e.,
the type of experiment, the goals of the ex-
periment, who will derive benefit from it, etc.).
In its Report, the Tuskegee committee, how-
ever, by choosing to focus its ethical condem-
I; nation almost exclu-
sively on the lack of
consent, rather than
on the actual sub-
stance of the experi-
ment itself (i.e., the
systematic lack of
care for the syphilitic
men) considers only
halfthe ethical point.
It fails to answer the
question as to
whether there is ever
a case when a person can "freely and intelli-
gently consent," but still be the subject of an
unethical experiment. In other words, is there
any limit to what may be construed as an ethi-
cal experiment besides the need for consent?
What if the Tuskegee experiment had been
exactly the same, except that the men had all
given their informed consent. Would it then
have been ethical? This question remain in-
sufficiently answered in the Tuskegee Final
Report. Although the debate concerning the
Tuskegee study moved the issue of human
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experimentation forward, there would be other
crises that would be needed to refine the dis-
cussion further.
The Willowbrook School experiments in-
volved the use of mentally retarded children
in hepatitis B vaccine research."'- Upon ap-
plication to the Willowbrook School, the
children's parents were asked permission to
enroll their child in the hepatitis study. The
study involved purposely infecting the chil-
dren with hepatitis B in order to test the effi-
cacy of various hepatitis vaccines. This re-
search was carried on for a number of years,
until eventually it was exposed in the local
and national media. When the experiment
came to public light, the initial discussion
centered once again upon informed consent.
Although the parents had given consent, there
were questions as to whether this had not been
subtly coerced, and whether parents ethically
could even give such proxy consent for their
In Evangelium Vitae, John Paul II ac-
knowledges this notion of life's sanctity
,
but moves to a much more radical posi-
tion of the source of life's sacredness.
Not only God's external sovereignty over
life, but, morefundamentally, the very
creation itself of life gives it its sanctity.
children. Despite this early debate around in-
formed consent, subsequent discussions pro-
ceeded to focus more on the actual substance
of the experiment. Ethicists began to ques-
tion whether it was even ethical to use human
subjects in these types of experiment, regard-
less of whether consent had been obtained.
David D. Rutstein noted that
found in which the large quantities of the vi-
rus needed for vaccine manufacture can be
grown; and an ethical constraint is the injuction
"not... to use human subjects for the growth
of a virus for any purpose."'^ Here one can
see that unlike in the Tuskegee Final Report,
the emphasis is more on the content of the ex-
perimental proceedings rather than on merely
the obtaining of consent. Rutstein and others
want to emphasize that in evaluating the eth-
ics of human experimentation informed con-
sent is necessary, but not sufficient. Although
the infonned and voluntiiry participation of the
subject is obligatory, informed consent by it-
self does not make for an ethical experiment.
The ethical status of human experimentation
also depends on the nature, method, and goals
of the ongoing research study.
In light of the lessons learned from his-
tory, what moral norms or principles should
guide the use of human beings in medical re-
search today? As noted,
traditionally, many
have appealed to the
utilitarian philosophy.
Medical research has
the ability to generate
an almost inexhaustible
amount of data to ben-
efit all of humanity. Re-
alizing this, society has
come to expect the ben-
efits of this research as
an implicit right. If a
few individuals should happen to suffer to ob-
tain this progress, it is justifiable because the
larger society is overwhelmingly benefited.
As McDermott states,
ethical constraints that prohibit certain
human experimentation are similar in
their effects as are scientific constraints
on the design of experiments.'^
In research on infectious hepatitis, a scientific
constraint is applied by the fact that no labo-
ratory animal susceptible to hepatitis has been
to ensure the rights of society, an arbi-
trary judgement must be made against an
individual.'^
In this consequentialist scheme, the rightness
or wrongness of any human experimentation
is judged by its consequences, or what hap-
pens as a result of the experiment. There are
several advantages to using utilitarianism to
guide human experimentation. It provides re-
searchers with guidelines for deciding what
to do: namely, whatever produces, on bal-
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ance the greatest good for the greatest num-
ber. Moreover, the "greatest good" is alleg-
edly something empirical, something both
measurable and comparable. In biomedical
research, the "greatest good" can be quanti-
fied by measuring lower societal morbidity,
mortality, illness rates, etc., regardless of
whether a "few" individuals had to suffer in
the research process. In principle, therefore,
utilitarianism provides definite answers to the
question of how we ought to act when con-
sidering human experimentation: if the
greater good (i.e. society, state, nation) will
benefit, it is morally justifiable.
Utilitarianism can be subjected to a num-
ber of objections and criticisms. As a guide to
human experimentation it ultimately fails, as it
undermines the basic integrity of the experi-
mental subject as person. Utilitarianism re-
quires a calculation of the probable conse-
quences of each experiment in order to judge
its ethical character. In doing this, the human
subject loses full personhood and is transfomied
into a thing—a unit to be fed into the utilitar-
ian calculus. In Martin Ruber's terms, a per-
son moves from being a "thou" to an "it." ''*
Here the value of life becomes discontinuous.
Life, and its worth, is calculable; it is placed
on a sliding scale: if the sacrifice of a single
life can benefit others, it can be morally justi-
fied. Among other reasons, this aspect of utili-
tarianism is inadequate as a moral theory, as
it conflicts with some of the most basic moral
intuitions. Most people would agree that to
kill an innocent person to benefit society could
hardly be justified. Similarly, most would say
that the sacrifice of individual human subjects
is not acceptable, even if to benefit society at
large. Ultimately, utilitarianism fails because
it does not recognize the special and invio-
lable moral status of each person. As Henry
Beecher observes,
a particularly pernicious myth is the one
that depends on the view that any ends
justify means. A study is ethical or not at
its inception. It does not become ethical
merely because it turned up valuable data.
Sometimes such a view is rationalized by
the investigator as having produced the
most good lor the most people. That is
blatant sialism. Whoever save the inves-
tigator the god-like right lo choose mar-
tyrs? ''
In contrast to utilitarianism, Kant regarded
each person as possessing an inviolable moral
status. In this deontological perspective, ev-
eiy person must be treated as an end, and never
merely as a means to fulfill the purposes of
the few or the many. This Kantian ideal is
reflected in the insistence that patients and
research subjects must give their informed
consent before they can be treated or used in
experiments. In this scheme, autonomy and
self-determination is emphasized. By respect-
ing each individual subject's autonomy, phy-
sicians and researchers continue to value them
as self-conscious active moral agents. This
Kantian principle should tiike a preeminent
position in guiding human experimentation.
It rightfully acknowledges each person as an
individual who demands respect. By using
the Kantian principle, human subjects can
never be used simply as means to an end
—
regardless of how beneficial that end may be.
In the Kantian scheme, each individual comes
to be seen not merely as "subject," but also as
"person." Unlike an experimental subject, a
person requires respect, equality, and just con-
sideration. By using this principle to guide
human experimentation the preservation of
human dignity is ensured.
Although the Kantian principle provides
substantial guidance in human experimenta-
tion, it is not sufficient. As Hans Jonas notes,
this Kantian principle can be overly simplis-
tic in its evaluation of human experimentation.
What is wrong with making a person an
experimental subject is not so much that
we make him thereby a means, as that we
make him a thing—a passive thing merely
lo be acted on, and passive not even for
real action, but for token action whose to-
ken object he is.'**
Jonas argues that in social contexts others are
constantly used as means to ends. For ex-
ample, at the grocery store the cashier is used
as a means to satisfy the end of obtaining food.
Using others as means in this way occurs all
the time. Jonas argues that this is not the criti-
cal ethical point in human experimentation;
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rather, what is of ethical concern is the objec-
tification—the making of the subject into a
thing. Undoubtedly the Kantian argument has
this somewhat in mind with its well-known
maxim of "means" and "ends." Jonas, how-
ever, wishes to refine the argument by focus-
ing more explicitly on the process of objecti-
fication that can occur with the use of humans
in experimentation.
Jonas argues that what makes the use of
human subjects in experimentation unethical is
the reducing of the person to being a mere to-
ken "sample." The components of personhood
are denied to the subjects of experimentation
when they are acted upon without being en-
gaged as individual moral agents. As in the criti-
cisms of the Tuskegee Final Report, Jonas cau-
tions against using mere consent as a blanket
ethical sanction for human experimentation. In
addition to ensuring informed consent at the
start of the experiment, the investigator has the
continued duty of upholding the subject's per-
sonal dignity and human worth throughout the
whole experimental process.
One place where the inherent value of the
human subject has strongly been upheld is in
the religious tradition, especially as articulated
by the Roman Catholic Church. Religious
traditions attempt to articulate a basis for the
inviolable character of the human experimen-
tal subject. Similar to Kant and certain other
philosophers, the Roman Catholic Church de-
mands respect for the human subject as per-
son. The Church, however, goes further by
providing a source for the special protected
status of the person-subject. The Christian
understanding of life, personhood, and their
relation to God informs opinions on human
experimentation. Human life forms the basis
of all goods and is the necessary source and
condition of every human activity and of all
society. In Evaugeliiim Vitae, Pope John Paul
II specifically addresses the fundamental is-
sue of the sanctity of life.''' Prior to his writ-
ings, the sanctity of life was articulated in an
essentially different manner. Life was sa-
cred because it came from the authority of
God and. thus, only God had sovereignty
over it. As the author of life, only God had
the power to extinguish it. In this understand-
ing, the source of life's sacredness lies with-
out. Life itself is not necessarily sacred or
holy, but God's authorship and sovereignty
over life sanctifies it. Humankind is to be
respected in experimentation not because hu-
man life is inherently sacred or worthy, but
rather because God is sovereign over human
life and no one has the right to use it indis-
criminately. In EvangeUum Vitae, John Paul
II acknowledges this notion of life's sanc-
tity, but moves to a much more radical posi-
tion of the source of life's sacredness. Not
only God's external sovereignty over life,
but, more fundamentally, the very creation
itself of life gives it its sanctity. In creating
humankind, God breathes a sanctity into life
that cannot be abolished. In shifting the fo-
cus from sovereignty to creation, John Paul
II relocates the sanctity of life from the ex-
ternal (sovereignty, authorship) to the inter-
nal (creation itself). In doing this he re-em-
phasizes the inviolable nature of life. The
sanctity of life is not something external that
can be detached from life; rather, it resides
in the indivisible creation of it by God. He
challenges every physician and biomedical
researcher to see the sanctity of life deep
within the mystery of life itself. Research-
ers are called to give witness to life as
amystery not wholly capable of comprehen-
sion, measurement or quantification. Jersild
et al. write that, given the checkered nature
of the history of human experimentation,
this sense of mystery allied with our sense
of the sanctity of life, has been seen by
Christians to provide an important bul-
wark in maintaining humane social or-
der.-"
Attention to life as mystery can serve to keep
biomedical researchers mindful of the sanc-
tity of the subjects of experimentation.
Regarding biomedical research, the Ro-
man Catholic Church also cautions
[Ajn intervention on the human body af-
fects not only the tissues, the organs and
their functions, but also involves the per-
son himself on different levels. It in-
volves, therefore, perhaps in an implicit
but nonetheless real way, a moral signifi-
cance and responsibility.-'
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Whereas medicine and science can often be
reductionistic, viewing individuals as only
biological "organisms" or "subjects," the Ro-
man Catholic Church wants to remind us to
see each human person as an integrated
whole—spiritual and embodied. The Pope
reaffirmed this to the World Medical Asso-
ciation in 1993, when he said:
Each human person, in his absolutely
unique singularity, is constituled not only
by his spirit, bul by his body as well.
Thus, in the body and through the body,
one touches the person himself in his con-
crete reality.^^
Thus, research must work to integrate the good
of human life by materially and physically
caring for the subject while respecting his or
her dignity. In this way, this religious per-
spective warns against the dehumanizing po-
In addition to ensuring informed con-
sent at the start of the experiment, the
investigator has the continued duty of
upholding the subjects personal dignity
and human worth throughout the
whole experimental process.
tential of medical research, where there is al-
ways the danger of not seeing the subjects for
who they are, but instead for what the re-
searchers design and intend. No matter how
good the end product (i.e., earthshaking re-
search results, or the "saving" cure), the ex-
perimental procedure must not have been de-
humanizing.
By treating subjects as "means" to an
"end" we expropriate God's role. Paul
Ramsey strongly warns against this type of
usurping of God's dominion in his book. Fab-
ricated Man.
We should not play God before we have
learned to be men. and as we learn to be
men we will not want to play God.^''
He further argues that we "play God":
. . .[when we] fail to honor the parameters
of human life, when we forget that we
are essentially creatures of flesh born of
other creatures in the midst of love.'"*
In scientific research, care must be taken not
to go beyond the parameters of human life
and love, infringing on God's dominion and
exclusive power to shape the essential qual-
ity of life. Christianity, therefore, reminds re-
searchers to deal with human subjects not just
as physical bodies, but also as persons with
spiritual and emotional needs—as integrated
wholes. In this important way, religion can
provide a much-needed counterbalance to the
reductionistic tendencies of the scientific
method. Informed by a religious perspective,
the physician-scientist gains an ethical orien-
tation that serves as a guide for the treatment
of the research subject as a person who must
be protected from harm, engaged as a moral
equal, and assured of both moral and physi-
cal integrity. Unlike the
Kantian maxim of "means
and ends," the religious per-
spective, with its focus on
the sanctity of life, the inte-
grated nature of the human
person, and the role of com-
passion and care, provides
a more detailed outline of
what justice demands when
it comes to the human sub-
ject. It takes seriously Jonas' caution not sim-
ply to avoid using people as means (as this is
not entirely possible in reality), but, more im-
portantly, to eschew objectifying others when
they become the subjects of experimentation.
A religious perspective necessitates that the
researcher always direct his or her actions pri-
marily to the cultivation and protection of the
individual subject, and secondiu^ily to the ben-
efit of society.
The ethics of human experimentation is
still a developing field within medicine. In-
tense debate began at the time the Nureinberg
trials, where a challenge was leveled at the
utilitarian justification for the reprehensible
experiments performed by Nazi experiment-
ers. The utilitarian approach disregards the
inherent and inestimable worth of each per-
son. The subsequent Nuremberg Code and
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Helsinki Declarations represent critical ad-
vances in ethical thinking in which the inalien-
able value of the individual is established as
the primary good over against any societal
claim to research benefits. This philosophi-
cal shift represents an embracing of the
Kantian principle of never using persons as
means to an end. Despite substantial focus
on experimental method, the main impact of
these documents is the insistence on obtain-
ing the infomied consent of research subjects.
In the 1970s, ethicists such as Hans Jonas, as
well as those criticizing the Willowbrook ex-
periments, questioned whether informed con-
sent is a sufficient criterion for ethical experi-
mentation. They concluded that it is not, and
the beyond the need for consent, the "con-
tent" of the experiment also needs to be ethi-
cal. The method and process of the experi-
ment must be humanizing and affimiing of
the subject as moral agent. A religious per-
spective that emphasizes the sanctity of life
can serve to guide the ethical character of
experimental "content." Such a religious per-
spective provides a comprehensive moral
foundation, demanding respect for the
subject's moral agency and right to be treated
as equally worthy members of the human
community, thus ensuring the integrity of the
subject as person. Ultimately, only by vali-
dating the worth of the experimental subject
as person, and as moral agent, can just and
true progress be achieved through biomedi-
cal experimentation.
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